Frustration and complaints over China’s zero-covid-19 policy have led to mass protests in more than a dozen cities, on a scale not seen since the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.
These youth-led protests also involved an open call for change not only in COVID-19 policies but also in governance and politics. The main message from the data coming out of China: Preventing policy conflicts in increasingly large organizations can lead to civil unrest overnight despite high visibility and increased security.
Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party has responded by moving to ease some of the virus’s restrictions despite the increase in daily cases, showing a less conservative position in the face of growing protests.
But an important test for President Xi Jinping lies ahead: What has he learned from the outpouring of anger on China’s streets, in its universities and in its factories?
Different politics
After the student-led protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, which were triggered by the death of pro-revolutionary leader Hu Yaobang, the ruling CCP drew a lesson from the incident by adopting a collective leadership that was open to public and private dialogue. people.
Subsequent Chinese leaders, including Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, moved away from power politics to a power-sharing model at the top. In addition, the CCP underwent major reforms – the so-called “re-establishment” – under the leadership of such great leaders as Zeng Qinghong (vice president of China under Hu Jintao), Li Yuanchao (vice president in the early years of Xi’s regime), and political expert Wang Huning. .
This has resulted in a contradiction of the party’s policies in different areas and furthering the practice of regionalization which gave power to local authorities to promote economic development. Some observers described this as an example of the CCP’s “authoritarianism,” where a single leader could not dominate policymaking in all areas and had to share power with his colleagues in the Politburo and the Standing Committee – the party’s top organs. .
The political game was changed from a winner-take-all model to a power-sharing model, in which all members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo were given equal political authority, resulting in greater power-sharing and higher checks. levels. The authority’s authority was undermined by fragmented enforcement, limited oversight and numerous legal disputes.
Xi changed the game in 2012, when he replaced Hu Jintao as general secretary of the CCP and began a “re-centralization” process that consolidated his power as the party’s top leader.
Facing a disillusioned public frustrated by the yawning gap between money and corruption, Xi borrowed from Mao Zedong’s playbook and urged civil servants and the military to reconnect with ordinary people – while imposing limits on discussions of ideas such as democracy and freedom of speech. .
As the ruling party tightens the media and controls its views, China’s opinion leaders have become more cautious than ever about dissenting views on public policy or human rights. This has led to the power policy debate in the CCP under Jiang and Hu being suspended. The result: increased risk from policy errors, as there are fewer checks and balances in place.
Studies on protests
China’s early success in containing the spread of the coronavirus was praised at home and abroad, but increasingly, the economic and social costs of its zero-COVID policy have become unbearable.
Anger against the seemingly permanent lockdown has spread like wildfire and public discontent over travel restrictions has grown.
Throughout the year, people have complained about access to medical care and problems buying food because delivery services were full. Others have reported that conditions are not working well in quarantine facilities and have asked why those who have tested positive for the virus should be quarantined in these facilities even if they are asymptomatic. Some have expressed outrage at the policy of separating infants and toddlers with COVID from their parents.
Recent trends show that all these ideas are now coming together. These are the first international demonstrations in decades, ranging from university students, small business owners and ordinary Chinese citizens. It started with a fire in Urumqi, Xinjiang, which killed 10 people who were said to be inside a closed building.
This followed a recent accident in Guizhou province, where 27 bus passengers died on their way to a public park. The government should have heeded the tiredness of zero-COVID complaints. But this would only be possible if policy makers were more responsive to complaints on social media and more engaged with health professionals and civil society groups.
The tight suspension in the year of the power transition – the CCP held its 20th Party Congress in October – has dampened the administration’s interest in the public’s anger at being shut down and tested.
After large-scale protests against COVID-19 restrictions in Belgium, the Netherlands and the United States, Chinese authorities should have been aware of the dangers associated with the imposition of quarantines and lockdowns. However, no major debates about the policies of COVID-19 have taken place in the public domain due to increased coverage and scrutiny.
If Xi wants further proof of the seriousness of the approach he has adopted, he need look no further than the aftermath of Jiang’s recent death. The former CCP leader and Chinese president has mourned many Chinese people. Jiang was not Hu Yaobang – in fact, he came to power after the brutal crackdown of the Tiananmen Square protests. However, many people consider him to have represented the past when China was considered free and tolerant of different opinions.
By now it should be clear to the Chinese leadership that it is unrealistic to expect to completely eliminate COVID-19 through isolation and repeated testing, due to the large spread of Omicron and the high number of asymptomatic cases.
Recent protests have not undermined Xi’s administration, but unless it changes, the government could face political protests against its policies on COVID-19. There’s also a big lesson here: Demonstrating anger in public has sent a signal to the leadership that public policy debates — where different opinions are allowed — are essential to understanding how the crowd works. It is a statement that Xi himself has emphasized many times. Now they know the danger of not translating the words into action.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect Al Jazeera’s influence.
